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DRUGS AND ALCOHOL---THEIR EFFECT
ON CRIMINAL INTENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
The purpose of this article is to review the history and
the present standing of criminal intent and responsibility as
affected by intoxication from the use of alcohol and drugs.
Courts have generally treated alcohol and drugs in the
same way and then looked to the effect on the individual to
determine the importance of the state of intoxication.' Early
authorities suggested that drunkenness should be an aggravation of any criminal act.' During this period, courts considered that to allow such conduct to be a defense would be
to promote an immoral activity, and that to allow such activity
as defense to any crime would be unthinkable.' From these
harsh early rules, the courts have moved in the direction of
allowing intoxication, by both drugs and alcohol, to be a
complete defense in some instances, and to rebut a specific
intent in other situations.
INTOXICATION AND ITS EFFECT ON INTENT

Judicial development and statutes have viewed drunkenness in different lights depending on whether the crime
charged required a specific intent or a general intent, and
whether the intoxication is voluntary or involuntary.4
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION

The general rule, as expressed by the Wyoming court,
seems to be that if the party charged "was so intoxicated as
not to know what he was doing, and was incapable, for that
reason of forming an intent he is not guilty of a crime
requiring a specific intent."' When the crime being charged
only requires a general intent, courts have unanimously stated
that voluntary intoxication is no defense.'
Courts have stated, in most cases, when the individual is
found to be voluntarily intoxicated and the crime charged
1. 21 AM. JuR.2d Criminal Law § 109 (1965); State v. Bower, 440 P.2d 167
(Wash. 1968).
2. See generally, Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 (1966).
3. Shannahan v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush (Ky) 463 (1871).
4. Wyo. STAT. § 6-16 (1957) 21 Am. JuR.2d Criminal Law § 107 (1965).
5. Gustavenson v. State, 10 Wyo. 300, 68 P. 1006, 1011 (1902); People v.
Wilson, 67 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1968).
6. 21 AM. Jua.2d, supra note 4.
Copyright@ 1970 by the University of Wyoming
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requires a specific intent, that it is a jury question as to
whether the individual's state of intoxication was so great
as to prevent him from forming the required intent.' Thus,
the defendant must show not only that he was intoxicated,
but that the degree of intoxication was to such extent that
he could not form the specific intent.
In those cases where the jury finds the defendant unable
to form the intent required, the prosecution usually charges
another crime in which no specific intent is required.' This
type of situation arises when the prosecution asks for first
degree murder, and the jury finds that the defendant lacked
the specific intent; the prosecution then charges some lesser
offense, which requires a general intent, i.e., manslaughter,
second degree murder.
Even if the defendant can prove to the jury's satisfaction that the state of his intoxication was so great as not to
enable him to form the specific intent required, the court
might still find him liable if the prosecution can show that
the defendant "deliberately resorted to the use of intoxicants
with the object of dulling any compunctions he thought might
otherwise hamper him in effecting his purpose."' In such
a situation, the intent was formed prior to the commission of
the act; thus, the consumption of the intoxicant had no effect
as to the formation of that intent. However, if the party
charged with the commission had formed a lesser intent, i.e.,
battery, prior to consumption, then later in a condition of
intoxication formed a greater intent, i.e. murder, it would
seem that the court would instruct the jury that if they found
the intoxication of the defendant was such that he was unable
to form the required intent for murder, the defendant would
be found not guilty. The courts might, on the other hand,
feel that if any intent, general or specific, was formed prior
to deliberate use of intoxicants with the object of dulling any
compunctions, the defendant might be rightfully charged and
convicted of murder. Such a holding would not seem logically
sound in view of the necessary requirement of proving the
7. People v. Costillo, 65 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1968).
8. State v. Tramtino, 44 N.J. 358, 209 A.2d 117 (1965); State v. Painter,
135 W.Va. 106, 63 S.E.2d 86 (1950).
9. People v. Tuthill, 31 Cal. App. 2d 92, 187 P.2d 16, 22 (1947).
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formation of the required intent, but the courts may feel that
such a rule would be sound in light of public policy.
The public policy viewpoint would be particularly strong
if the earlier intent and the later intent were both concerning
crimes against the person, as opposed to crimes directed
against property. Consider an individual who intends to
strike another, i.e. a battery, then deliberately becomes intoxicated with the motive of reducing any subsequent compunction, and while intoxicated, kills the victim. A court might
not require the finding of any specific intent which otherwise
might be required for murder, because the defendant had
formed an intent to commit a crime against a person prior
to becoming deliberately intoxicated.
Another consideration along the same lines might also
be worth noting. Assume that the defendant intends to commit
a battery and subsequently becomes intoxicated, but not deliberately with the motive of dulling any compunctions that
might arise. The defendant, in such an intoxicated state,
commits a murder, and the prosecution asks for first degree
murder, which requires a specific intent.
Even if the specific intent to kill cannot be established,
the court might reach the same decision that it did on the
previous example, i.e. that a specific intent is not required
if a general intent to commit an act against a person was
formed prior to voluntary intoxication, even though the crime
ultimately charged required a specific intent.
This was true in the previous example because the motive
for the intoxication was to reduce any compunction which
might arise prior to the commission. However, in this latter
example, there was no such motive. If the motive of the intervening intoxication is the important element (not merely the
intoxication), then without a wrongful motive the court should
require the finding of a specific intent. However, the court
could conclude that the motive of the intoxication is not the
important element. In effect, the court would be holding that
all that is required is the finding of a general intent to commit
a crime against a person, and any subsequent voluntary intoxication cannot be used to show that the defendant could not
have formed a specific intent required for the crime charged.
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INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION

The Wyoming statute on drunkenness is a typical example
of the effect of involuntary intoxication as related to the
formulation of intent.1° The Wyoming statute states that if
the drunkenness is "occasioned by the fraud, contrivance or
force of some other person or persons for the purpose of
causing the perpetration of an offense," the party charged
is not held whether the crime required a general or specific
intent. This same reasoning is used in jurisdictions where
there is no statute to this effect."
The only question upon which there is not universal
agreement in this area is the definition of involuntary intoxication, when the statute or judicial decisions have not defined
that term. Courts have, for the most part, adopted a definition
similar to the Wyoming statute. The question has been
brought into sharp focus by several recent cases in which
courts have looked at the chronic alcoholic or addict, and
questioned whether he becomes intoxicated voluntarily or
involuntarily.
The United States Supreme Court in Robertson v. California" held that a California statute which made the addiction to drugs a criminal offense was violation of the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution as cruel and
unusual punishment. In 1966, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Easter v. District of
Columbia" held that the same reasoning applies to alcoholism.
The dicta in Robertson and Easter to the effect that
chronic alcoholism and drug addiction are involuntary have
brought into question the more limited definition used by
most courts and statutes. Also, these two cases have led
several writers to conclude that the courts were saying that
chronic aicon-ouism andUdiruig au-luiU are to be tr eate as
involuntary forms of intoxication, thus relieving the addict
from all criminal responsibility. However, the court in Easter
went on to say that it in no way meant that voluntary intoxi10.
11.
12.
13.

WYo. STAT. § 6-16 (1957).
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Robertson v. State, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 11.
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cation, even by the chronic alcoholic or addict, would be a
defense to a crime requiring a general intent. 4
In Powell v. Texas,1" the Supreme Court held that even
though the status of addiction or alcoholism is not criminally
punishable under Robertson v. California, a statute which
provides criminal liability for a person who is drunk or
intoxicated in a public place can be constitutionally applied
to an addict or alcoholic, because the status of such condition
is not being labeled as criminal. The Texas statute "imposed
upon the appellant a criminal sanction for public behavior
which may create substantial health and safety hazard, for
both the appellant and for the member of the general public." 6
Thus, an alcoholic or addict is said to consume voluntarily
and to be held to the same responsibility as the non-addict or
non-alcoholic.
Courts have been unwilling to hold that the addict or
alcoholic consumed intoxicants involuntarily, because to do
so would be to hold him not liable for any criminal activity;
this would be contrary to public policy." Thus, at present it
is safe to say that the alcoholic or addict will not escape
criminal responsibility except where his status as such is
made the basis of a criminal charge.
RELATIONSHIP OF INTOXICATION TO INSANITY

The fact that a criminal act was committed while the
actor was under the influence of alcohol or drugs is generally
no defense to the charge, under an insanity plea.' This idea
was expressed as the universal rule in early decisions concerning intoxication from alcohol and drugs. 9
Today some courts have taken a second look at the effects
of intoxicants, and in some cases have been willing to allow
a defendant relying on intoxication to show insanity. The
courts which have allowed such a defense have always required
the defendant to show extreme intoxication induced by either
drugs or alcohol, and generally required the defendant to be
an addict or an alcoholic.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 53.

Powell v. Texas, 36 U.S.L.W. 4619 (U.S. June 18, 1968).
Id. at 4620.
Gustavenson v. State, supra note 5; State v. Tramtino, supra note 8.
21 AM. JuH.2d, supra note 4.
Shannahan v. Commonwealth, supra note 3.

HeinOnline -- 5 Land & Water L. Rev. 205 1970

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. V

Requirement of Addiction and Alcoholism
In State v. Kidwell,2" the court held the defendants could
support a valid insanity plea only if the insanity was caused
through long continued indulgence in intemperance or intoxication, causing delirium tremens. Thus, if there was no longterm use which amounted to alcoholism, the fact that the
defendant suffered from delusions and hallucinations is no
defense, because the defendant was not laboring under a
mental disease or affliction. 1 In effect, the court in Kidwell
was holding that delusions and hallucinations caused by
severe intoxication, in the absence of a long and continued
use, is not a disease and could not qualify as insanity.
This distinction was and still is used in those jurisdictions
which require the person being charged to suffer under some
actual physical disease which can be identified, i.e., an organic
deterioration of the mind or an extreme functional psychosis.
A 1963 Alaska case22 held that "a state of mind created
by voluntary intoxication is not a major disorder or disease
or mental derangement which amounts to legal insanity. The
majority of courts have drawn a distinction between (1) the
mental effect of intoxication which is the immediate result
of a particular alcoholic bout, and (2) an alcoholic psychosis,
such as delirium tremens, resulting from long continued habits
of excessive drinking."23 The Alaska court stated that the
former does not amount to legal insanity whereas the latter
may.
Those jurisdictions which follow the rule expressed in
the Alaska case are those that generally follow the M'Naghten
test and require a defect of reason from a disease of the mind.
In those jurisdictions, the fact that an individual has delusions
and hallucinations which are equally as severe as the delirium
tremens suffered by the chronic alcoholic makes little difference, because in the first instance the individual was not
suffering from a long-term or identifiable mental disease.
Thus, in those jurisdictions, it is not the mental state of the
20.
21.
22.
23.

State v. Kidwell, 62 W.Va. 466, 59 S.E. 494 (1907).
Id. at 495.
McIntyre v. State, 379 P.2d 615, 8 A.L.R.3d 1231 (Alaska 1961).
Id. at 616, 617.
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defendant at the time of committing the act that is important,
but what actually led up to that state.
Courts which have considered the sanity of a drug addict
have generally reached the same conclusion, and require that
the individual show a long-term use of the drugs to constitute
an illness or disease. 5 Thus, if the individual who uses drugs
as intoxicants only occasionally and is in no way addicted
to them commits a crime while under the influence of the
drugs, he cannot escape criminal liability. This is true even
if the effect of the drug causes severe delusions and hallucinations, and but for the hallucinations and delusions, the criminal act would have not been committed.
The courts do not require the individual to continue to
be in a state of insanity. All that is required is that the effect
of long and continued use of intoxicants is sufficient to produce and does produce "a fixed and settled frenzy or insanity
either permanent or intermittent. 2
Assuming the addiction is of such character as to qualify
as "insanity," the courts allow an individual who can show
a long-term use amounting to either addiction or alcoholism
to escape liability, even though his mental condition at the
time of commission was not permanent or longlasting. Thus,
once the individual proves alcoholism or addiction of a proper
character, he need only show that while under the influence
of the substance, he experienced delusions and hallucinations
which caused him to commit the crime. The party charged
does not need to show that the delusions or hallucinations
lasted after the commission of the crime, only that they
existed at the commission.
The attempt to show temporary insanity as a result of
intoxication, except from long and continued use, is of no
avail either, because of the lack of a mental disease. 7
Hallucinogens and the Model Penal Code
If the Model Penal Code2" standards of criminal responsibility are considered in terms of a defense based on intoxica24. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 747 (1957).

25.
26.
27.
28.

Brown v. United States, 331 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Cirack v. State, 210 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1967).
State v. Cameron, 137 So. C. 371, 135 S.E. 364 (1926).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
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tion without long-term use, then we may get a different result.

The Model Penal Code provisions, as adopted by United States
v. Freeman,29 require that "a person is not responsible for
his criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result
of mental disease or defect, he lacks the substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of Law.''" If under
the requirement of a mental disease or defect we can fit a
situation of severe intoxication which results in delusions
and hallucinations, then the requirement of long-term use
may not be needed.
A mental disease or defect as used by the Model Penal
Code has been defined as meaning an abnormal condition of
the mind which substantially impairs the capacity to control
behavior; it does not depend upon psychiatric labels or medical classifications and terms.3 It is fairly easy to see that
an individual who is experiencing extreme delusions and
hallucinations may in fact be said to be suffering from a
mental disease or defect.
The effect of alcohol, in the absence of chronic alcoholism,
is probably never great enough to cause delusions and hallucinations. This can be said to be at least the general situation.
True enough, for a defendant to contend that he was so
affected by alcohol as to constitute a disease or defect under
the Model Penal Code definition would probably require some
extreme situation. For this reason, let us turn our attention
exclusively to the effects of drugs.
The effect of certain drugs on the individual can cause
an experience which can be classified under the definition of
mental disease or defect. This can even be more easily acceptable if the individual was under the influence of one of the
relatively new high-power hallucinogens. Early researchers
noted similarities between the effects of the hallucinogenic
drugs and those of mental illness ...especially schizophrenia,

a mental disease widely recognized.
29.
30.
31.
32.

2

United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
Id. at 625.
Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Note, Hallucinogens, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 521 (1968).
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The effect of the drug on the individual depends on the
psychological state of the individual and the drug used."'
Hallucinogens are legally defined as drugs which affect the
central nervous system "in such a fashion as to cause the
user to have a distorted sense of reality." 4 But all drugs
that are classified hallucinogenics do not have the same effect
on the central nervous system. L.S.D. can produce a variety
of intense and unusual psychic effects. These effects may
range from a loss of time and space perception and mild apprehension to panic, severe elation, and deep depression. 5 Amphetamines and cocaine both are likely to induce a state of
excitability and propensity to violence. 8 These are but a
few of the many drugs which can produce conditions similar
to conventional definitions of insanity.
If the courts will look at the effects of the drug on the
individual, rather than first looking to see if the individual
is an addict, there will be a movement to allow a non-addict
to defend the charge on an insanity plea when his mental
state, at the time of the commission, is within the definition
of a mental defect or disease.
An important factor which has been considered by some
courts in considering criminal responsibility of an individual
under the influence of a drug is whether the individual could
forsee the possible consequences of taking the drug. One
court has relied more on this factor than on whether the
taking was voluntary."
It appears that the actual knowledge of the probable or
even improbable effects of a drug would be enough for a
court to find the lack of a "mental defect." This could be
justified on public policy alone,88 for to allow one who knows
a probable consequence of a voluntary act to rely on those
consequences to eliminate his criminal responsibility would
be extremely detrimental to society. Here, the liquor comparison is apt.
33. Id.
34. H.R. REP. No. 130, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965).
35. Rosenthal, Persisent Hallucinosis Following Repeated Admini stration of
Hallucinogenic Drugs, 121 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 238 (1964-1965).
36. Bieser, Drugs and the Law or Who Pays for the "Trip"?, 36 U. CIN. L. REV.
39, 48 (Winter 1967).
37. DeBerry v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1956).
88. Gustavenson v. State, supra note 5; State v. Tramtino, eupra note 8.
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If, on the other hand, the individual did not realize the
consequences of taking the drug, then the public policy argument would not be nearly as strong, and he could not be held
to appreciate the danger.
A second factor that courts could consider before allowing a non-addict to show insanity would be whether the criminal act was against property, or the person. The courts could
adopt a standard which would allow the showing of insanity
in relation to crimes against property, but not to crimes
against the person. This would result in a double standard
and require the court to consider not only the defendant's
mental state but also the act committed. The courts are
currently using a double standard by considering the defendant's mental state, and then looking to see if he is an alcoholic
or an addict. Thus, the proposed double standard is in reality
not that significant, and would in effect only replace the
double standard currently used. The courts need only look
for the effect of the drug on the defendant, (not also considering whether he is an addict) and whether the crime
committed was against the person or property.
Such a standard, especially if the courts also consider
whether the defendant knew or appreciated the effect of the
drug, would be a compromise between the public policy approach and a true standard concerning the defendant's mental
condition at the time of commission.
CONCLUSION

It appears that the courts are beginning to recognize
the effects of intoxicants in relation not only to criminal
intent but also to criminal responsibility viewed from the
insanity standpoint. Courts are allowing expert testimony
to be used to show the mental state of the individual at the
commission of the crime. Courts are becoming more aware of
the effect of drugs on the mind and fully realize that long
and continued use of intoxicants is not needed to put the
individual's mind in a state very similar to a chronic mental
diseases of very long duration.
The only factor that yet remains static is the courts'
reluctance to allow an individual who is voluntarily intoxiHeinOnline -- 5 Land & Water L. Rev. 210 1970
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cated to escape total liability for an act committed in such a
state, even though the mental condition of the individual falls
within the boundaries of the typical definitions of a mental
defect or disease. This reluctance to recognize insanity in
this area is probably best explained by public policy considerations. There is an understandable hesitancy to allow an
individual to murder his mother while under the influence
of L.S.D., and then escape total liability."
In these types of situations, courts cannot justify a decision of acquital, as did Justices Fortas and Douglas in their
dissenting opinions in Bud v. California,"° when they stated
that it is time to stop criminally punishing the person suffering from an illness. Their argument was that such individuals
should be treated in hospitals. This argument is not applicable
to the voluntarily intoxicated individual who does not have
an illness or is only deranged for a short period of time and
then completely recovers. However, if the courts would adopt
a standard which would consider whether the individual knew
or appreciated the effect of the intoxicant, and whether the
criminal act was against the person or property, the public
policy objections would be reduced.
WILLIAM L. CORBETT
39. Cotnam, Accidents Caused by Drug Abuse, INT'L NARcoTIc ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS ASS'N SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE REPORT

40. Bud v. California, 385 U.S. 909, 910-911 (1966).
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